Works In Progress

Working Papers

Presented the paper at the 2023 Politics of Industrial Policy Conference at Princeton University's Niehaus Center of Globalization and Governance (NCGG), and the 2022 annual meetings of the International Studies Association (ISA).

How has the rise of state-led capitalism globally affected national competitiveness? Under the banner of the Belt and Road Initiative, China uses its national development banks as a form of overseas industrial policy to capture new commercial markets internationally. This paper develops a new theory of global development finance, contending that China’s state-led financing has catalyzed policymaking diffusion about the importance of state banking support for national firms. Building on the globalization literature, we anticipate that this diffusion reflects global capital competition and peer emulation. However, diffusion is limited by national financial endowments, catalyzing a process of micro-emulation, where national governments use limited resources and knowledge of firm-level ecosystems to target competitive advantages.

Employing national development banks as our unit of analysis, we develop an original Development Finance Institution (DFI) Index that classifies three different types of state-led financial instruments: export credits, overseas development loans, and state-backed equity investments. We conduct a comparative case study analysis of the BRICS economies, given their growing role in the international financial architecture. We find a generalized expansion of development finance institutions, but also a shift in DFI tool composition away from traditional export credits, and towards overseas development loans and equity investments over time.

“The Fed’s Mandate Trilemma & the Evolution of Central Banking in the United States.”

Institute for International Economic Policy, Working Paper Series. IIEP-WP-2025-5

Presented an earlier version at the 2023 Yale Law School conference, Public Law, Political Economy, Corruption, and Development: Susan Rose-Ackerman’s Scholarly Legacy. In S. Rose-Ackerman (ed.), Public Sector Performance, Corruption, and State Capture in a Globalized World, Routledge Research in Public Law. Chapter 6.

Following the 2008 financial crisis, the Federal Reserve restored its historic financial stability mandate with new monetary tools to help mitigate the credit crunch and stimulate the economy. This article develops a new theory about the Fed’s mandate trilemma, suggesting the central bank’s financial stability goals have complicated its ability to meet its dual mandate of full employment and price stability. By stretching its monetary policy operations to meet three goals simultaneously, the Fed has created an impossible trilemma. To achieve financial stability and full employment, it tends to maintain easy credit conditions for longer than optimal, making eventual inflationary pressures more likely. To test these theoretical priors, this article conducts a plausibility probe of the 2023 regional banking crises, finding that political constraints reduced the feasibility of more traditional banking supervisory powers, placing the financial stability onus on monetary policy.

Books

"Managing Debt and Development: How China’s Financial Statecraft Works in Latin America.”
Cambridge Elements. Accepted for series on the Politics of Development. Work in Progress.

Presented under the earlier draft title, "Waiting for Growth: The Political Economy of Chinese Statecraft in the Americas" at the annual meetings of 2024 American Political Science Association (APSA), the 2023-24 International Studies Association (ISA), the 2023 Latin American Political Economy Network (REPAL), and the Mortara Research Seminar at Georgetown University.

– Top 10% most downloaded papers on the Social Science Research Network.

Over the last half-decade, China has become the world’s largest official creditor amid mounting international debt difficulties. What is the relationship between China’s state-led finance and growing debt distress? This book develops a theoretical framework for China's global financial statecraft. The traditional approach to sovereign debt sustainability, led by the IMF and Paris Club, emphasizes the short-term viability of sovereign borrowers by promoting financial disclosure and economic reform. China participates in such multilateral initiatives, signaling its willingness to be a global stakeholder, but often prefers maintaining bilateral discretion to avoid recognizing bad debts or requiring significant reform.

When do Chinese creditors choose bilateral discretion? This book expects that China’s approach to debt relief reflects a two-tier strategy of bilateral-multilateral interactions in borrowing nations. China’s policy makers toggle between bilateral and multilateral debt relief solutions, striking a balance between the twin goals of maximizing its commercial influence and helping ensure regional financial stability. China’s financial statecraft is thus conditional on both the strategic importance of its bilateral financial linkages, and its financial power within international financial institutions (i.e., the IMF). Otherwise, when there is a low-level financial statecraft, where China invests in diplomatic prestige projects, overcapacity outlets, or basic infrastructure, debt relief is more firmly centered on the multilateral level. IMF programs help provide stability to the local investment environment, which benefits all creditors.

To examine these patterns, this book conducts a multi-method analysis using cross-national statistical tests (spanning 18 countries from 1991 to 2022) and a comparative case study analysis of five Latin American countries, finding that higher Chinese commercial conditionality leads to a greater prevalence of bilateral restructuring. Whereas China generally tends to independently pursue bilateral forbearance in countries where it has strategic linkages, its increased institutional power following the IMF’s 2016 reforms means its bilateral negotiations have also become more likely to facilitate multilateral debt relief. These findings have important implications for the literature on the political economy of sovereign debt, financial globalization, and international development.

The Creditor Dilemma: The Political Economy of China’s International Debt. Work in Progress.

This book examines how China’s emergence as the world’s largest official creditor affects the rules and norms of sovereign debt restructuring. How do borrowers renegotiate the terms of debt restructuring with Chinese lenders? During the pandemic, the Common Framework for Debt Treatment hoped to expedite debt forgiveness, but international stakeholders have yet to arrive at a creditor consensus, casting a shadow over the future of global finance. This book first examines the historical development of today’s international financial architecture and its competing approaches to resolving national indebtedness. It then constructs a theoretical framework for debt and development before later examining the variation in debt relief cross-nationally across three different regions: Africa, Latin America, and South and Southeast Asia. This empirical analysis will help assess the likelihood that the Common Framework can forge an institutional convergence toward a debtor-friendly institutional framework, or if divergent debt relief approaches between China and the West will bifurcate the institutional architecture, impeding debt sustainability and international economic stability.